Thinking About Dilution

January 19, 2012

By: Paul A. Jones

For most entrepreneurs, dilution is an ugly word. Being diluted, after all, is about giving someone else a piece of your business. All other things being equal, that’s not a good thing. That said, for entrepreneurs that need third party risk capital to fund their business, dilution is inevitable. And (the silver lining in the dilution cloud) not always as bad as it might seem.

Entrepreneurs facing dilutive events typically have two concerns, both related to a reduction in relative ownership of the business: loss of management control and a diminished share of the “upside” if the business succeeds. Let’s look at control issues first.

Fear of losing management control to investors is something that keeps a lot of entrepreneurs up at night. Too often, though, the fear assumes that there is some magic number – usually 50% ownership – around which control pivots. Alas, it is not anything like that simple. The (possibly disturbing) fact is, an owner of the smallest fraction of a company’s equity (indeed, a creditor without any equity stake at all, though that is a matter for another blog) can have de facto control of a company’s management. And, indeed, venture capital investors with minority ownership positions almost always have substantial management control, as for example rights to prohibit strategic transactions (e.g. sale or merger of the business), limit future sales of equity, etc. well beyond those rights they would enjoy from a simple “who has the most shares” analysis. The devil, in terms of management control, is in the fine print of the deal terms, not the gross percentage of equity owned. The take home here is that control in venture backed startups is more a function of the (hopefully thoughtfully negotiated) finer points of the deal terms than simply a function of who has the bigger/majority equity interest.

As for dilution reducing an entrepreneur’s share of the upside, by definition, an equity investment involves some grant of interest in future profits and/or exit value to the investor. For purposes of this blog, we’ll assume that the investor’s stake is commensurate with its ownership stake, though it need not be: while an investor’s ownership stake is less likely to diverge significantly from the investor’s ownership share than its control rights, such discrepancies are not uncommon, if not usually as significant.

Now it is fair enough to say that giving a third party any stake in the ultimate equity value created by the business necessarily dilutes the interests of the prior stakeholders. But the story is more complex than that. Taking on a new investor is a priori (if not always a posteriori) a classic win-win proposition. More specifically, the investor is investing because he believes that the investment will grow in value, while the entrepreneur is accepting the investment ( and dilution) because she believes that the value of her diluted share of the post-investment equity in the business will exceed the value of her (undiluted) pre-investment equity. Unless both parties anticipate a wealth enhancing proposition, there won’t be a deal.

The win-win story is most easily understood in the context of an “up” round: that is, where the new investor pays a higher price than the prior investors. So, for example, an entrepreneur who owns say 50% of a business where the previous investor paid $1.00 per share is demonstrably wealthier if she takes on an additional investor at $2.00 per share even if doing so dilutes her ownership down to 25%. In fact, her wealth (even if not her liquidity) has been doubled (she now owns the same number of shares, each of which is worth twice what it was before the investment).

The $1.00/$2.00 example above does not mean that an entrepreneur should always accept dilution if doing so would increase her wealth. It may be that while the $2.00 offer doubles her wealth, the ownership stake she is selling is worth more than $2.00 to some other investor. What the example does illustrate, though, is that a dilutive event can also be a wealth enhancing event. Indeed, even in a down round scenario (say the price goes from $1.00 to $0.50 per share) the entrepreneur should only accept the dilutive event if she feels that her diluted ownership stake after the investment will be worth at least as much as her undiluted stake if she forgoes the investment.


Corporate Venture Capital: An Entrepreneur’s Perspective

January 16, 2012

By: Paul A. Jones

While never a dominant part of the venture capital industry, corporate-sponsored venture capital investors (think for example AOL Ventures) have long been an important part of the industry. Entrepreneurs thinking about seeking venture capital should, preferably at the beginning of the quest, consider whether they want to seek, or will even consider, corporate venture capital. For some deals, corporate venture capital is a priority; for most it is an option; and for some, it might be a last resort. Herewith, some of the issues to consider.

Corporate Venture Capital as Deal Validation. Generally, the more technology risk a deal has, the more attractive corporate venture money is, all the more so when the expected amount of pre-revenue capital needed and time to market are greater. Corporate venture capital is often a plus, for example, in biopharma deals, where technology risk, capital needs and time to market are huge. Getting a corporate fund in a deal sends a powerful due diligence signal to all but the highest tier traditional funds (they are as a rule less impressed by third party due diligence) that the science passes the blush test. On the other hand, deals where time to market, technology risk and risk capital requirements are not so great – say, a niche social networking concept – are not likely to get as great a validation enhancer across as broad a range of traditional funds.

Corporate Venture Capital as Lead Investor – Usually Not. As a rule, corporate funds don’t make very good lead investors. First, while a corporate fund can be a nice validator, getting too close to a corporate fund can make doing business deals with companies that compete with the corporate fund’s parent harder to do. If “Competitor A” is your lead investor, “Competitor B” will be understandably more cautious about doing a deal – or even sharing information – with you than if Competitor A is only a follower in the deal. Further, remember that most corporate funds (there are exceptions: ask) are not “pure return” investor, and thus is not in a good position to set the price – which is one of the important things the lead typically, well, takes the lead on. Traditional funds will, quite correctly, discount an entrepreneur’s assertion that a price agreed to by a corporate fund is a fair price, particularly if the corporate fund is not a pure return investor.

Corporate Venture Capital: The People Difference. Not to say that there are not exceptions, and not to say that corporate venture capital professionals are not exceptional in their own corporate worlds, corporate venture capitalists are as a general rule not the brightest bulbs in the venture capitalist universe. First, compensation at most corporate venture capital firms is generally not as generous/aggressive as at traditional funds that don’t have to “fit in” to a broader corporate compensation system. If traditional venture capital firms pay more, you would expect they would attract the best people. Second, corporate venture capitalists, while needing, of course, to earn the confidence of senior corporate managers, don’t have to go through the hurdle of successfully selling themselves to a typically fairly large group of sophisticated investors who specialize in evaluating venture capital professionals as traditional venture capitalists do. Finally, most traditional venture capitalists – certainly the stereotypical venture capital professional – are folks with big egos who like to make others fit to their rules rather than vice versa. That’s a personality profile that doesn’t generally fit very well in  below C-level jobs in big business management cultures.

Corporate Venture Capital: Here Today, ….Whether considering a relationship with a traditional or corporate venture firm, one criteria, of course, is how long a fund team  has been around: generally, fund teams that have managed several funds across several investing cycles are more desirable investors than less experienced funds. While there are notable exceptions, corporate venture capital funds don’t as a rule have the staying power of more traditional funds, as in addition to the performance hurdles all funds must overcome to stay in the business over the long haul, corporate funds have some of their own longevity issues. For example, being pieces (usually small ones at that) of much larger enterprises, corporate funds are subject to the whims of senior management teams that at most companies blow hot and cold on venture capital investing, depending on short-term earnings pressures and more broadly shifting management priorities over the corporate cycle and as senior managers come and go. Entrepreneurs considering venture capital should, to the extent possible, try to focus on corporate funds that have demonstrated both some staying power and some real success (which, of course, are also good criteria for evaluating competing proposals from traditional venture funds, too).

As noted, corporate venture capital is an important if relatively small part of the broader venture capital industry. There are, as with traditional venture capital funds, good corporate venture investors and not-so-good corporate investors. The ideas noted above are offered not as hard and fast rules, for all of them there are exceptions, but rather as a framework for analysis. An analysis that entrepreneurs are wise to undertake before launching a campaign for venture capital funding.


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